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Abstract—Machine learning algorithms have been shown to 
be suitable for securing platforms for IT systems. However, due 
to the fundamental differences between the industrial internet of 
things (IIoT) and regular IT networks, a special performance 
review needs to be considered. The vulnerabilities and security 
requirements of IIoT systems demand different considerations. 
In this paper, we study the reasons why machine learning must 
be integrated into the security mechanisms of the IIoT, and 
where it currently falls short in having a satisfactory 
performance. The challenges and real-world considerations 
associated with this matter are studied in our experimental 
design. We use an IIoT testbed resembling a real industrial plant 
to show our proof of concept. 
Keywords—Industrial Internet of Things, Intrusion and 
Cybersecurity Threat Detection, Machine Learning, Industrial 
Control Systems 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Leveraging the internet of things (IoT) technology in the 
industrial control systems (ICSs), known as the industrial 
internet of things (IIoT), has become very popular in recent 
years. ICSs are the essential part of every critical infrastructure 
and have been utilized for a long time to supervise industrial 
machines and processes. Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems often manage the ICSs and are 
considered as the largest subset of these systems. Main roles of 
these systems are to perform real-time monitoring and 
interacting with the devices, real-time gathering and analyzing 
the data, and logging all the events that happen in the system. 
Utilizing IoT technology in these systems enhances the 
network intelligence and security in optimization and 
automation of industrial processes. IIoTs are mostly mission-
critical applications with high-availability requirements. Their 
operations lead to a huge amount of data that can be easily 
managed through big data analysis methods. 
In the past, to secure ICSs from malicious outside attack, 
these systems used to be isolated from the outside world. 
However, recent advances, increased connectivity with 
corporate networks, and utilization of internet communications 
to transmit the information more conveniently have introduced 
the possibility of cyber-attacks against these systems. Due to 
the sensitive nature of the industrial application, security is the 
foremost concern. 
Since intrusion is the primary security concern in IIoT, an 
intrusion detection system (IDS) is an integral part of these 
applications to provide a secure environment. Stuxnet worm, 
which was exposed in 2010 [1] and recently reappeared (late 
December 2017), and Triton malware against the ICSs [2] 
raised awareness of the necessity for special attention to the 
security of these critical infrastructures. Through the 
fundamental differences between the ICSs and the regular IT 
systems, their common vulnerabilities and priorities are 
different [3]. Furthermore, ICSs have a specific type of traffic 
and data using particular IIoT communication protocols (e.g., 
Modbus, BACnet, DNP3). Due to all these reasons, proper 
diligence must be considered when it comes to designing an 
IDS for ICSs. 
Machine learning-based security solutions have been 
widely used in providing security for IT systems. However, the 
suitability of these techniques for IIoT applications is 
debatable. The main security concern in IIoT devices is to 
detect any penetration into the system. Intrusion detection 
comes with special features such as significant imbalanced 
datasets that sometimes the trained machine learning (ML) 
algorithms may not be able to detect the attack. 
In our previous works [4] and [5], we have designed 
different ML-based IDSs for ICSs through different attack 
scenarios, such as denial of service (DoS), SQL injection, and 
reconnaissance. However, we never truly studied the 
imbalanced datasets problem facing ML algorithms, where the 
real barriers are, and how different performance metrics would 
react to this problem. In this paper, after discussing how ML 
can be beneficial in IDS applications, we will study the cases 
where current machine learning algorithms fall short of 
providing the required level of security. More specifically, our 
main focus is on the imbalanced dataset problem in IIoT. The 
metrics that can fairly judge the performance have been 
compared to measure their effectiveness. 
2 RELATED WORK 
In this section, we review some of the related research 
works. To the best of our knowledge, imbalanced IIoT dataset 
problem with the significantly low number of minority samples 
has not been studied yet. 
The intrusion detection problem in smart grids using 
several different ML techniques has been studied in [6]. Some 
countermeasures to overcome the problem of imbalanced 
dataset have been examined. They have used ADFA-LD 
dataset that consists of 12.5% attack data. It is important to 
notice that this ratio is not realistic in the case of IIoT 
applications. Here we deal with less than 1% anomaly samples 
in our applications, which makes the results closer to real-
world scenarios. 
Various sampling techniques to overcome the imbalanced 
dataset problem have been investigated in [7]. The utilized 
datasets are extracted from Github and Sourceforge projects 
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with 15% imbalance ratio. This work is not cybersecurity nor 
IoT related, though it represents a practical case study on this 
imbalanced dataset problem. 
An IDS using a combination of J48 and Naive Bayes 
techniques is designed in [8]. The dataset was built using gas 
pipeline system of the Distributed Analytics and Security 
Institute, Mississippi State University, Starkville, MS. Their 
dataset consisted of different types of attacks such as 
reconnaissance, code injection, response injection, command 
injection. The J48 classifier was first used as a supervised 
attribute filter. Then, the Naive Bayes classifier was used to 
develop the anomaly-based intrusion detection. The ratio of 
attack traffic in their study was about 21.87%, which is far 
higher than a real-world case. 
Six different types of ML algorithms, Naive Bayes, 
Random Forests, OneR, J48, NNge (non-nested generalized 
exemplars), SVM (support vector machines) for IDS have been 
studied in [9]. J48 is a type of decision tree technique. Their 
dataset consists of labeled RTU telemetry data from a gas 
pipeline system in Mississippi State University’s Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Center. The attack traffic is generated 
from two types of code injection set, command injection 
attacks, data injection attacks. Seven different variants of data 
injection attacks were tried to change the pipeline pressure 
values, and four different variants of command injection 
attacks to manipulate the commands that control the gas 
pipeline. They used precision and recall metrics to make sure 
to have a fair evaluation in spite of the imbalanced dataset with 
about 17% attack traffic. 
K-means technique, which is an unsupervised clustering 
algorithm, for IDS has been employed in [10]. An open-source 
virtual PLC (OpenPLC platform) along with AES-256 
encryption is used to simulate an ICS. They have conducted 
three different types of attacks against their system, code 
injection, DoS, and interception (eavesdrop). However, they 
have not provided any information on the percentage of attack 
data that was used for training. 
One class SVM (OCSVM) as a proper anomaly-based IDS 
has been proposed in [11]. They declare that OCSVM is a good 
choice because the dataset is imbalanced. The authors just used 
two features of traffic (data rate and packet size) of an electric 
grid. The trained model did not include any malicious attack 
data, and the trained dataset was captured during normal 
operation of a SCADA system. 
3 WHY MACHINE LEARNING 
IDS as an effective mechanism to counter intrusions has 
been widely used to provide a secure platform. Rule-based, 
signature-based, flow-based, and traffic-based are just some 
examples of different ways that intrusion detection has been 
implemented. Regarding the IIoT system, traditionally most of 
the connections and traffics in an ICS network were pre-
defined. Hence, these types of IDS (ruled-based, signature-
based, etc.) would detect abnormal activities very efficiently. 
For instance, when the intruder had to somehow manipulate the 
structure, like building new connections to the victims or 
sending a different type of traffic, ruled-based IDS would be 
successful in detecting the malicious attempt [12]. 
However, considering frequent upgrades in the networks, 
which results in regular changes in the topology, the legacy 
types of IDS will not work. Since these IDSs are designed 
based on defined topologies (e.g., allowed connections, 
allowed devices, etc.) any small changes in the system will 
raise a false alarm, unless the whole IDS would be re-designed 
after each change, which is an intensive task and might not 
work properly. 
On the other hand, the legacy IDSs cannot keep up with the 
attackers constantly evolving their methods. Furthermore, to 
counter new attacks that appear every day, or in scenarios 
where the attack is planned perceptively (e.g., the man-in-the-
middle attack), intelligent IDSs are required. An anomaly-
based IDS that employs ML algorithms can detect any out of 
the ordinary activity if the training procedures are handled 
correctly. 
The intelligent IDS is based on the fact that AI algorithms 
can detect anomaly patterns that are difficult for a human to 
discover. Unlike rule-based IDSs, ML-based IDSs can 
successfully detect new types of attacks, different variants of a 
specific attack and unknown or zero-day attack. The zero-day 
exploit takes advantage of unknown vulnerabilities (i.e., the 
developers have no idea that they exist) to manipulate the 
processes or the system. These are all the reasons that ML 
should be applied in designing IDSs. 
4 WHERE MACHINE LEARNING FALLS SHORT 
Despite the confidence in the ability of machine learning 
(ML) to detect anomalies very effectively, there exist several 
challenges that arise when considering their applicability in 
IIoT. Without addressing these problems, the ML algorithms 
are unable to function properly. In an IIoT environment, some 
of these challenges might be manageable and some might not, 
due to the nature of these systems and their associated security 
aspects. 
The very first consideration is to choose proper features 
from the network traffic dataset. Sensor data in IIoT are usually 
obtained during an extended period from many sensors with 
different sampling frequencies, which results in high-
dimensional datasets. Using raw data like this will add a large 
delay in training and detecting process. On the other hand, If 
the selected features do not vary during the attacks, even the 
best algorithm will not be able to detect an intrusion or an 
anomalous situation using that feature. It is, therefore, 
necessary to extract discriminating features to be able to use 
ML techniques. Applying power spectral density, Fourier 
analyses, the linear feature extracting method, and principal 
component analysis (PCA) are some examples of methods that 
could be tried out to reduce the dimensionality and find the 
most useful features. 
On the other hand, due to the confidentiality and user 
privacy restrictions, industrial companies hardly release their 
protected network data on the intrusion attacks that might have 
occurred. Hence, training the ML algorithms on data collected 
from real networks of real industrial IoT’s is almost 
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impossible. Hence, most of the available research work in this 
area is done on commercial or public datasets that may not be 
specific to IIoT. That is another barrier in utilizing these ML 
techniques directly in companies or industrial networks. Due to 
this reason, we built our IIoT testbed and took all consideration 
into account to make it as resembling as possible to a real 
industrial plant. More details are provided in Section V. 
Furthermore, in any real world IIoT system, the number of 
intrusion attack samples is significantly low. Since the 
intruders do not wish to be exposed; they usually run their 
attacks randomly in short periods of time. This leads to a very 
low amount of attack data to train the ML algorithm. This 
problem is known as an imbalanced training dataset. In other 
words, imbalanced dataset means the percentage of the attack 
traffic compared to the normal traffic in the whole dataset is 
very low. In the following subsection, we will talk about this 
challenge in more details. 
4.1 Imbalanced Dataset 
Machine learning techniques like other artificial 
intelligence classifiers generally perform best on balanced 
datasets. The problem of imbalanced datasets, specifically 
those in severe cases (i.e., significantly low number of samples 
from one class compared to the other), is a critical issue in the 
training process. Examples of such cases include detecting rare 
anomalies like fraudulent bank transactions and identification 
of rare diseases. 
Intrusion detection, which is the main security concern of 
IIoT applications, is another case that suffers from the severely 
imbalanced dataset. Due to the large amount of sensed data 
from IIoT devices (i.e., a large amount of normal traffic) on the 
one hand; and random, rare attack traffic (i.e., a small amount 
of attack traffic) on the other hand, the IIoT’s security suffers 
greatly from imbalance problem.  
There have been countermeasures suggested for this 
problem, through changing the sampling method. Under-
sampling, over-sampling, or a combination of both are some 
examples. However, each of these techniques comes with 
several drawbacks. In simple terms, under-sampling means 
including fewer instances from the majority class, and over-
sampling means including more samples of the minority class. 
One problem with under-sampling is the possibility of losing 
useful information, while over-sampling might cause 
overfitting problems. These techniques can be very complex, 
and these details are out of the scope of this paper. 
Since, in a real IIoT system, any of these techniques might 
lead to an unrepresentative model, the resulting models may 
not be accurate to solve the intrusion detection problem in 
practice. Plus, they result in different outcomes compared to 
the models trained with the full dataset. 
There are other challenges that must be considered when 
training ML techniques for intrusion detection. Here, we 
briefly mentioned the ones that are most critical for IIoT 
applications. Due to all these reasons, the suitability of ML 
under different circumstances must be considered. In the next 
section, we study the limits on the imbalanced dataset 
challenge on our built IIoT testbed to show the real restrictions, 
when it comes to training ML-based IDSs. 
5 OUR EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In this section, we describe our testbed and the designed 
ML-based IDS system to show the efficiency of ML 
algorithms on an imbalanced IIoT dataset. In this system, 
intrusion detection is being evaluated by monitoring the 
system’s transactions to detect manipulated commands. 
5.1 Our Real-World Testbed Implementation 
Utilization of a real testbed allows conducting real cyber-
attacks and collecting a real dataset containing both normal and 
attack traffic. Considering the primary function of an ICS is to 
provide remote monitoring and automated control of industrial 
processes, we have emulated a real-world IIoT control system. 
Fig. 1 shows the platform of our testbed. 
We chose a popular IIoT system that supervises the water 
level and turbidity quantity in the water storage tank. This type 
of system is employed in industrial reservoirs and water 
distribution as a part of the water treatment and distribution 
process. This testbed includes components like historian logs, 
human-machine interference (HMI), programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs), a three-light alarm, sensors (e.g., water 
levels and turbidity), actuators (e.g., alarms, valve, pumps, and 
buttons), and control buttons (On, Off, Light Indicator). 
The main purpose of HMI in an ICS is to make it easy for 
the operators to observe the status of the system, interact with 
the IIoT devices, and receive alarms indicating abnormal 
behaviors. Moreover, since the sensors and relays cannot 
communicate directly, PLCs are used to collect the sensed data 
and send commands to the actuators. 
PLC
Internet
History Logs HMI
PLC
Valve
Pump 1
Pump 2
Turbidity 
Alarm
Sensor 1
Sensor 2
Turbidity 
Sensor
Modbus 
TCP
Ethernet
On Button
Off Button
Light Indicator
Water Tank
IDS
 
Fig. 1. Scheme of our implemented testbed 
The water storage tank has two level sensors: Sensor 1 and 
Sensor 2, which are used to monitor the water level in the tank. 
When the water reaches the maximum defined level in the 
system, Sensor 1 sends a signal to the PLC. The PLC turns off 
the water Pump 1 that is used to fill up the tank, opens the 
valve, and turns on the water Pump 2 draws water from the 
tank. When the water reaches the minimum defined level in the 
system, Sensor 2 sends a signal to the PLC. PLC closes the 
valve, turns off the Pump 2, and turns on the Pump 1 to fill up 
the tank. This process starts over again when the water level 
reaches the maximum level. Meanwhile, there is an analog 
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turbidity sensor that is integrated into the system to measure 
the turbidity of the water. Based on two defined thresholds in 
the system, PLC illuminates one of the red, yellow or green 
lights of the Turbidity Alarm, in which green means the water 
has an acceptable level of turbidity, red means the turbidity is 
beyond the acceptable thresholds, and yellow falls between the 
two thresholds. 
This IIoT testbed takes the data from sensors, and the status 
of the system from the PLC using the Modbus communication 
protocol and displays them to the operator through the HMI 
interface. Since Modbus is one of the most popular IIoT 
protocols, and it’s widely used by large industries, we chose 
this protocol. 
The PLC model used in our testbed is Schneider Electric 
Programmable Logic Controller model M241CE40. The 
analog expansion module is TM3AM6 Modicon I/O Module. 
The logic of the PLC is programmed using the Ladder 
language [13], [14]. The turbidity sensor is SEN0189, and the 
water level sensors are Autonics CR18-8DP sensors. The 
deployed water pumps are GA-2328ZZ uxcell pumps. 
5.2 Our Attack Scenario 
In this research work, we focused on the command 
manipulation attack in a water storage scenario to compromise 
the output commands. These attacks were carried out using the 
Kali Linux Penetration Testing Distribution using special 
programs for malicious command injection in ICSs. All data 
generated during the attacks as well as regular traffic (without 
attacks) was gathered and recorded by Argus [15] and 
Wireshark [16] network tools. 
During the command injection attack, our target is the PLC. 
First, the attacker connects to the network to be able to read all 
the PLC register values and log them into a .txt file. After 
having the PLC register information, the attacker rewrites some 
of the PLC registers that are vital to the physical process. For 
example, we ran this attack while Pump 2 was supposed to 
draw water from the tank, it was suddenly stopped by the 
attacker, and Pump 1 started, and the water overflowed from 
the tank. Another instance is when the attacker turned on the 
wrong turbidity alarm light, in the way that, while the turbidity 
level was high, and the red light was supposed to be on, the 
attacker turned off the red light and turned on the green light 
instead. 
5.3 Feature Selection 
In this case study, we use Artificial Neural Network 
(ANN). The model is trained and tested over the imbalanced 
dataset collected from our testbed, and the results of their 
performance are compared (details in the next Subsection). 
TABLE I. SELECTED TRAFFIC FEATURES IN OUR PROPOSED IDS 
Features Type Descriptions 
Mean flow (mean) Float The average duration of active flows 
Source Port (Sport) Integer Source port number 
Destination Port (Dport) Integer Destination port number 
Source Packets (Spkts) Integer Source/Destination packet count 
Destination Packets (Dpkts) Integer Destination/Source packet count 
Total Packets (Tpkts) Integer Total transaction packet count 
Source Bytes (Sbytes) Integer Source/Destination bytes count 
Destination Bytes (Dbytes) Integer Destination/Source bytes count 
Total Bytes (TBytes) Integer Total transaction bytes count 
Source Load (Sload) Float Source bits per second 
Destination Load (Dload) Float Destination bits per second 
Total Load (Tload) Float Total bits per second 
Source Rate (Srate) Float Source packets per second 
Destination Rate (Drate) Float Destination packets per second 
Total Rate (Trate) Float Total packets per second 
Source Loss (Sloss) Float Source packets retransmitted/dropped 
Destination Loss (Dloss) Float 
Destination packets 
retransmitted/dropped 
Total Loss (Tloss) Float Total packets retransmitted/dropped 
Total Percent Loss (Ploss) Float Percent packets retransmitted/dropped 
Source Jitter (ScrJitter) Float Source jitter in millisecond 
Destination Jitter (DrcJitter) Float Destination jitter in millisecond 
Source Interpacket (SIntPkt) Float 
Source interpacket arrival time in 
millisecond 
Destination Interpacket 
(DIntPkt) 
Float 
Destination interpacket arrival time in 
millisecond 
 
An important step in training the algorithm is selecting and 
extracting features from the raw network traffic traces. Here, in 
designing our IDS, we chose 23 features. These features are 
common in network flows and also show a good variation 
during the attack phases. Table I shows the chosen features 
along with their description. 
How each feature varies depends on the type of the attack. 
For instance, during the normal condition, where no attack is 
conducted, the SrcPkts and DstPkts features mostly show a 
periodic behavior. Meanwhile, during attacks, these features 
behave randomly. 
5.4 Imbalance Setting 
Our main goal here is to examine the efficiency of ANN in 
detecting anomaly through different imbalance ratios. We 
collected a new dataset of 2.7 GB, for a total of about 53 hours. 
The number of attacks at each trial has been kept equal to 
10000 samples, and accordingly, we added normal traffic to 
build the desired ratios. Table II is a summary of the number of 
samples used. At each round of training, we divided the dataset 
into 80% for training and 20% for testing. 
TABLE II. OUR BUILT DATASET STATISTICAL INFORMATION 
Ratio # of Attack #of Normal Total 
10.0% 10,000 90,000 100,000 
1.0% 10,000 990,000 1,000,000 
0.7% 10,000 1,418,572 1,428,572 
0.3% 10,000 3,323,334 3,333,334 
0.1% 10,000 9,990,000 10,000,000 
 
5.5 Performance Metrics 
Traditionally, the performance of the trained algorithms is 
measured by metrics which are derived from the confusion 
matrix. Table III shows the confusion matrix. 
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TABLE III. CONFUSION MATRIX IN IDS CONTEXT 
 
Predicted Class 
Classified as Normal Classified as Attack 
Actual 
Class 
Normal Data True Negative (TN) False Positive (FP) 
Attack Data False Negative (FN) True Positive (TP) 
 
The description of the matrix confusion parameters is as 
follows: 
• True Negatives (TN): Represents the number of normal 
packets correctly classified as normal. 
• True Positives (TP): Represents the number of 
abnormal packets (attacks) correctly classified as 
attacks. 
• False Positive (FP): Represent the number of normal 
packets incorrectly classified as attacks. 
• False Negative (FN): Represents the number of 
abnormal packets (attacks) incorrectly classified as 
normal packets. 
According to the confusion matrix, the metrics that are used 
in this work to evaluate the performance of the ML algorithms 
are as follows: 
• Accuracy: Shows the percentage of the correctly 
predicted samples considering the total number of 
predictions. 
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0.7% 10000 1418572 1428572 
0.3% 10000 3323334 3333334 
0.1% 10000 9990000 10000000 
 
At each round of training, we divided the dataset into 80% 
for training and 20% for testing. 
E. Performance Metrics 
Traditionally, the performance of the trained algorithms is 
measured by metrics which are derived from the confusion 
matrix. Table IV shows the confusion matrix. 
Table IV. Confusion Matrix in IDS Context 
 
Predicted Class 
Classified as Normal Classified as Attack 
Actual Class 
Normal Data True Negative (TN) False Positive (FP) 
Attack Data False Negative (FN) True Positive (TP) 
	
The description of the matrix confusion parameters is as 
follows: 
• True Negatives (TN): Represents the number of normal 
packets correctly classified as normal. 
• True Positives (TP): Represents the number of 
abnormal packets (attacks) correctly classified as attacks. 
• False Positive (FP): Represent the number of normal 
packets incorrectly classified as attacks. 
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abnormal packets (attacks) incorrectly classified as normal 
packets. 
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TP+TN
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 × 100 (1) 
• False Alarm Rate (FAR): Represents the percentage of 
the regular traffic misclassified as attacks. 
FAR= 
FP
FP+ TN
 × 100 (2) 
• UN-Detection Rate (UND): The fraction of the 
anomaly traffic (attack) misclassified as normal. 
UND= 
FN
FN+TP
 × 100 (3) 
• Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC): Measures 
the quality of the classification. MCC is a great metric, 
especially in case of imbalanced datasets, showing the 
correlation agreement between the observed values and the 
predicted values. 
MCC= 
TP×TN-FP×FN
! (TP+FP)×(TP+FN)×(TN+FP)×(TN+FN)2
 × 100 (4) 
• Sensitivity: Also known as the true positive rate. A 
sensitive algorithm helps rule out an attack situation with 
more confidence when the prediction is negative. 
Sensitivity= 
TP
TP+FN
 × 100 (5) 
Accuracy (Eq. 1) is the most frequently used metric for 
assessing the performance of learning models in regression 
problems. However, this metric is not sufficient for 
performance evaluation in scenarios with imbalanced classes 
(i.e., one class is dominant and has more training data 
compared to the other). In our case, which is an IDS 
scenario, the proportion of normal traffic to attack traffic is 
very high resembling a realistic dataset. Therefore, in 
addition to the accuracy, we use other metrics that represent 
the performance better and in a more delicate way. 
F. Results 
In this section, we present the numerical results of our 
algorithms detecting the command injection attacks through 
different ration of imbalance as it was mentioned in the 
previous Subsection. Through all these figures, each point 
on the graph is marked with the corresponding ratio (e.g., 
“10%” means the ratio of attack samples to the normal 
samples is 1 to 9). 
As it is shown in Figure 4, representing the accuracy 
results (Eq. 1), it seems there is not much difference in 
accuracy performance. However, this is not true. In intrusion 
detection scenarios with imbalanced dataset, accuracy is not 
the best representative metric to evaluate the performance. 
Since a large portion of training data is normal traffic, the 
algorithms are biased toward estimating all the data as 
normal and ignoring the small portion of the attack 
instances. 
	
Figure 4. Accuracy 
The false alarm rate (FAR), shown in Figure 5, represents 
the percentage of the normal traffic being misclassified as 
the attack traffic by the model (Eq. 2). As again it is seen, 
Figure 5 shows good performance for all the cases. 
However, for the same reason, even this metric cannot truly 
represent the performance. For example, Since the number 
of attack traffic is considerably low in 0.1% scenario, the 
algorithms would barely label any instances as attack, so we 
would expect a low FAR percentage. 
	
Figure 5. False Alarm Rate	
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(i.e., one class is dominant and has more training data 
compared to the other). In our case, which is an IDS 
scenario, the proportion of normal traffic to attack traffic is 
very high resembling a realistic dataset. Therefore, in 
addition to the accuracy, we use other etrics that represent 
the performance better and in a more delicate way. 
F. Results 
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on the graph is marked with the cor ponding ratio (e.g., 
“10%” means the ratio of attack samples to the normal 
samples is 1 to 9). 
As it is shown in Figure 4, representing the accuracy 
results (Eq. 1), it seems there is not much difference in 
accuracy performance. However, this is not true. In intrusion 
detection scenarios with imbalanced dataset, accuracy is not 
the best representative metric to evaluate the performance. 
Since a large portion of training data is normal traffic, the 
algorithms are biased toward estimating all the data as 
normal and ignoring the small portion of the attack 
instances. 
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The false alarm rate (FAR), as shown in Fig. 3, represents 
the percentage of the normal traffic being misclassified as the 
attack traffic by the odel (2). As a ain it is seen, Fig. 3 shows 
good performanc  for all the cas . However, for the same 
r ason, ev n this metric cannot truly represent the 
performance. For example, Since the amount of attack traffic is 
considerably low in the 0.1 % scenario, the algorithms would 
barely label any instances as an attack; hence, we would expect 
a low FAR percentage. 
Undetected rate (UR) metric can assess the performance 
better despite being imbalanced. As shown in Fig. 4, UR 
represents the percentage of the traffic which is attack traffic 
but is misclassified as normal (the opposite of the FAR) (3). 
Since this metric considers only the attack traffic, the fact of 
having an imbalanced dataset does not impact the evaluation 
that much. The training with 0.1% attack training data was 
barely able to detect any anomaly and showed the worst 
performance as it was expected. This metric is more critical 
than FAR because it is related to the attacks that happen 
without being detected by the system. 
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Fig. 4. Effect of Imbalance on Undetected Rate 
MCC (5) is considered to be one of the best metrics for 
classification evaluation, and it is generally a better 
performance representative compared to the other metrics. As 
shown in Fig. 5, the more attack data is used for training, the 
better the MCC value we would get. MCC is considered as an 
appropriate metric when it comes to evaluating ML models that 
are trained with an imbalanced dataset. 
 
Fig. 5. Effect of Imbalance on MCC 
Finally, the sensitivity metric results (6) are shown in Fig. 6 
to evaluate how sensitive the model is to able to react to an 
abnormal situation. As seen in the figure, training with more 
abnormal traffic will result in showing more sensitivity in the 
detection performance. 
 
Fig. 6. Effect of Imbalance on Sensitivity 
To provide a performance comparison with a baseline 
sampling method, we chose synthetic minority over-sampling 
technique (SMOTE). In this technique, we synthesize new fake 
attack data from the existing attack samples based on their k 
nearest neighbors. For more information, we refer the readers 
to [17]. We ran this method only for 7%, 3%, and 1% anomaly 
ratios since these three were the severe cases. 
Fig. 7 shows the undetected rate before and after using the 
SMOTE technique. As it is shown in this picture, this method 
decreased the rate of undetected attacks to 0 for 0.7% and 0.3% 
imbalance ratios and to about 57% in the 0.1% case. Even 
though through this technique at 0.1%, we achieved a better 
rate, still more than half of the attack data were not discovered. 
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Fig. 7. Effect of SMOTE Method on Undetected Rate 
The MCC results are shown in Fig. 8. We observe a great 
improvement in the 0.3% case, with a slight degradation with 
the 0.7% imbalance ratio. As a result, this oversampling 
technique helped the system distinguish the attack scenarios 
more effectively and perform better in low imbalance ratios. 
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Fig. 8. Effect of SMOTE Method on MCC 
6 CONCLUSION 
The cyber-security of the IIoT devices is critical. Intrusion 
detection is the main security concern in these applications. 
Machine learning solutions and big data analytics have been 
widely used to ensure a secure platform in these systems. 
However, when it comes to a real-world scenario and applying 
these algorithms practically, they sometimes fall short. The 
main focus of this paper was studying imbalanced dataset 
problems and show in which extend the machine learning 
algorithms are able to help. 
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